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ABSTRACT
Since its proposal in 2013, geo-indistinguishability has been consol-
idated as a formal notion of location privacy, generating a rich body
of literature building on this idea. A problem with most of these
follow-up works is that they blindly rely on geo-indistinguishability
to provide location privacy, ignoring the numerical interpretation
of this privacy guarantee. In this paper, we provide an alternative
formulation of geo-indistinguishability as an adversary error, and
use it to show that the privacy vs. utility trade-off that can be ob-
tained is not as appealing as implied by the literature. We also show
that although geo-indistinguishability guarantees a lower bound
on the adversary’s error, this comes at the cost of achieving poorer
performance than other noise generation mechanisms in terms of
average error, and enabling the possibility of exposing obfuscated
locations that are useless from the quality of service point of view.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Geo-indistinguishability (GeoInd), a formal notion of location pri-
vacy introduced in [2], builds on the concept of differential pri-
vacy [7] to design user-centric location privacy-preserving mech-
anisms. To gain privacy while preserving some utility, in these
mechanisms users report to service providers obfuscated versions
of their actual locations. GeoInd guarantees that obfuscated loca-
tions are statistically indistinguishable from other locations within
a radius around the users’ real location. One of the most appealing
features of GeoInd, inherited from differential privacy, is that it
guarantees that, regardless of any side-information about the user
she might have, the adversary learns little additional information
about the real location from observing the obfuscated version.
Since its proposal [2], GeoInd has drawn a lot of attention from
the research community. A first research line extends this notion
to consider mobility traces instead of single locations [5, 10], or to
consider semantic and geographic privacy [6]. Some works focus
on how to use GeoInd, or on integrating GeoInd with other pri-
vacy metrics [9, 11] to design optimal location privacy-preserving
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mechanisms, either in simplified [3] or realistic [4] scenarios. Fi-
nally, GeoInd has been also used to implement plugins to sanitize
locations for its use by other mobile applications [8] or browsers [1].
A common issue in these works is that they chooseGeoInd based
on its core qualitative advantage, namely that it provides protection
for the users in a region around their real location regardless of the
adversary’s side-information. However, they do not evaluate and
reason quantitatively about how much protection the mechanisms
provide, i.e., if the level of privacy they achieve is meaningful.
In this work, we illustrate that GeoInd can be misleading both in
terms of privacy and utility. We propose an alternative definition of
this privacy notion as an adversary’s error, and study numerically
the privacy level provided by the state-of-the-art mechanisms that
guarantee this property. We also examine the trade-off between
privacy and utility, showing that even though GeoInd mechanisms
ensure a minimum privacy protection, this comes at the expense
of performing poorly in terms of average protection, and possibly
generating an obfuscated location very far away from the user.
2 GEO-INDISTINGUISHABILITY
We first describe the operation of user-centric perturbation-based
sporadic location privacy mechanisms. Consider a user, Alice, that
wants to get some service from a service provider from her real
location x ∈ X. Before exposing her location to the provider, Alice
uses a location privacy mechanism f to generate an obfuscated lo-
cation z ∈ Z, with probability f (z |x).X andZ are sets of locations
that we assume discrete for notational simplicity, although we note
that all the results in this paper are applicable to the continuous
scenario. By using mechanism f , Alice trades in utility for privacy.
For example, if Alice’s query is “give me the bars in a radius of 100
meters from my location”, releasing an obfuscated location z away
from x might result in bars that are far away from her, but also pro-
tects her location since the probabilistic nature of the mechanism
f prevents the adversary from learning her true location x .
We define the multiplicative distance between two distributions
σ1(s) and σ2(s) on a set S as dP (σ1(s),σ2(s))  sups ∈S
log σ1(s)σ2(s) 
with the convention that
log σ1(s)σ2(s)  is 0 if σ1(s) = σ2(s) = 0 and∞
if only one of the two is 0.
In this scenario, geo-indistinguishability is defined as [2]:
Definition 2.1 (ϵ-Geo-Indistinguishability). A mechanism f pro-
vides ϵ-geo-indistinguishability if and only if, for all input locations
x ,x ′ ∈ X, the following holds
dP (f (z |x), f (z |x ′)) ≤ ϵ · d(x ,x ′) , (1)
where d(x ,x ′) is the Euclidean distance between x and x ′.
The rationale behind this privacy notion is the following: by
bounding the multiplicative distance, we ensure that the probability
that Alice reports z when she is in x is similar to the probability
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that she reports z when she is in x ′ (up to a multiplicative factor of
eϵ ·d (x,x ′)). Therefore, an adversary observing z cannot statistically
distinguish between x and x ′ as Alice’s real location. The upper
bound in (1) depends on d(x ,x ′) and ϵ . The former dependence
is very intuitive: given an obfuscated location z, two locations
x ,x ′ ∈ X that are very close result harder to distinguish (i.e., f (z |x)
is close to f (z |x ′)) than if they were further apart. The role of ϵ ,
on the other hand, is to tune the degree of GeoInd. Smaller values
of this parameter ensure that f (z |x) and f (z |x ′) are closer, and
therefore provide a higher degree of privacy than larger values.
Prior-Agnostic Protection. GeoInd provides a privacy guaran-
tee independent of any side information about x the adversary
might have. Let π (x) be a probability mass function over x ∈ X
representing the prior adversary’s side information about Alice’s
real location x . After observing z, the adversary can update her
knowledge by computing the posterior probability mass function
p(x |z) = f (z |x) · π (x)∑
x ′∈X f (z |x ′) · π (x ′)
. (2)
By using (1) and (2), it is easy to show that GeoInd implies
dP (p(x |z),π (x)) ≤ ϵ · d(π ) , (3)
where d(π ) is the maximum distance between two locations x and
x ′ such that π (x) > 0 and π (x ′) > 0. In other words,GeoInd ensures
a certain degree of similarity between the adversary’s prior and
posterior information about Alice’s real location, for any prior π .
Note that GeoInd is not an absolute privacy guarantee, but only
ensures that given z the adversary gets no significant extra accuracy
with respect to the prior. However, if given this prior the adversary
can pinpoint a user’s location to a small region in the map (small
d(π )), then even though z does reveal little information about x ,
the adversary’s estimation of x will still be accurate.
Choosing the Privacy Parameter. The general approach to se-
lecting a proper value for the parameter ϵ is to pick a privacy level
ϵ∗ and a privacy radius r∗, and set ϵ = ϵ∗/r∗. This ensures that,
when Alice is in x and releases z, her location is statistically indis-
tinguishable from all the other locations x ′ within a radius of r∗
around her, i.e., dP (f (z |x), f (z |x ′)) ≤ ϵ∗ as in (1).
Quantitatively, however, it is hard to determine if a bound on the
multiplicative distance ϵ∗ gives “enough privacy”. This is reflected
in the literature, where there is no consensus about which value of
the bound in (1) denotes a high degree of indistinguishability. In
the seminal paper [2], Andrés et. al choose ϵ∗ = log 2 in a radius of
r = 200 meters as the highest privacy level. This bound is used by
some follow-up works [1, 6], while others take different values of
ϵ∗, ranging from ϵ∗ = log 10 [5] to ϵ∗ = log 1.4 [4].
3 GEOIND AS AN ADVERSARY ERROR
In this section, we introduce an alternative characterization of
GeoInd as an adversary error. This characterization helps us in
providing more intuition behind the privacy level obtained for a
specific value of the privacy parameter ϵ , and in understanding the
protection it provides beyond the upper bound expressed in (1).
Consider that the adversary’s side information is that Alice is
equally likely in either of two locations x and x ′, i.e., π (x) = π (x ′) =
0.5. After observing z, the adversary has to decide between x and x ′.
We refer to this adversary as the decision adversary. Assume, with-
out loss of generality, that f (z |x) ≥ f (z |x ′), and thus the optimal
decision in terms of minimizing the adversary’s probability of error
is deciding that Alice’s location is x . In this case, the adversary’s
probability of error is
pe (x ,x ′, z) = f (z |x
′)
f (z |x) + f (z |x ′) . (4)
Then, Geo-indistinguishability can be defined as follows:
Lemma 3.1 (ϵ-Geo-Indistinguishability as error). A mecha-
nism f guarantees ϵ- geo-indistinguishability if and only if, for any
pair of input locations x ,x ′ ∈ X and any output location z ∈ Z,
it ensures that the minimum probability of error p∗e of the decision
adversary described above is
pe (x ,x ′, z) ≥ p∗e =
1
1 + eϵ ·d (x,x ′)
. (5)
It is easy to see that the GeoInd definitions in (1) and (5) are
equivalent by substituting (4) in (5) and operating. We have chosen
π (x) = π (x ′) = 0.5 as prior knowledge for the decision adversary,
as this ensures the guarantee in (1), but we note that when π (x) ,
π (x ′) GeoInd does not guarantee a minimum probability of error
against this adversary.
This alternative definition of GeoInd allows us to intuitively
interpret the privacy guarantee achieved by f . For example, given
ϵ = 2km−1 and two locations x and x ′ separated d(x ,x ′) = 0.5km,
according to (1) the multiplicative distance between f (z |x) and
f (z |x ′) is bounded by 1. However, whether an upper bound on the
multiplicative distance of 1 is a reasonable level of protection is not
clear. In terms of probability of error, (5) bounds the adversary’s
error to be pe ≥ p∗e = 0.27: before observing z the decision adver-
sary has a probability of correctly guessing Alice’s input location of
0.5, and after the release her probability of success is in the worst
case 0.73. It is difficult to consider this worst case probability as
“high indistinguishability”, which contradicts the GeoInd idea of
achieving indistinguishability for every pair of input locations. We
explore the implications of this interpretation in the next section.
4 GEOIND IN NUMBERS
In this section, we quantitatively evaluate the privacy and utility
achieved byGeoIndmechanisms. For privacy, given a fixed distance
between two locations x and x ′, we measure both the upper bound
on the multiplicative distance in (1), ϵ∗ = ϵ · d(x ,x ′), and the lower
bound on the probability of error (4) of the decision adversary, p∗e .
For utility we consider two metrics: the average loss r, measured as
the average Euclidean distance between the actual location of the
user x and the obfuscated location z [3, 4, 6, 9–11], and the radius
of the circular region centered around x where z is with probability
0.95, denoted by r95 [1].
We evaluate two GeoInd mechanisms. First, the planar Laplace
mechanism, proposed in the seminal work [2], implemented in [1, 8],
and used as a baseline for comparison in [3, 4]. This mechanism gen-
erates obfuscated locations z from the actual location x by adding
2-dimensional Laplace noise to the latter. Second, the planar Laplace
with remapping [4], current state-of-the-art. This mechanism first
generates a temporary location z′ by adding 2-dimensional Laplace
noise to x , and then performs a deterministic remapping from z′ to
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Figure 1: Performance of the Planar Laplace mechanism.
z that is designed to minimize the average loss r of the scheme while
providing the same privacy guarantees as the original version. This
remapping is computed using a dataset with information about the
popularity of each input location x ∈ X, and therefore the mecha-
nism is tied to a particular dataset. We leave optimal mechanisms
that can only be implemented in simple discrete scenarios [3, 9, 11]
out of our evaluation, as the low-resolution quantization needed to
implement them in a real scenario makes them suboptimal (cf. [4]).
Planar LaplaceMechanism.Given a privacy value ϵ , the average
loss of the Laplace mechanism is r = 2/ϵ , and r95 can be computed
analytically using the Lambert W function (cf. [2]). The value of
p∗e can be computed from ϵ following (5). We show p∗e and ϵ∗ for
this mechanism, when locations are separated d(x ,x ′) meters, in
Figure 1 for different utility levels. As expected, as we add more
noise (larger r or r95), protection improves (larger p∗e or smaller ϵ∗).
To better understand the trade-off between privacy and utility let
us consider as reference a privacy level p∗e = 0.4 (i.e., the decision
adversary succeeds at most 60% of the times). To obtain such pro-
tection level in a radius of r∗ one needs to add Laplacian noise with
average loss of r ≈ 5r∗. This results 5% of the time on an obfuscated
location z further than r95 ≈ 12r∗ from the real location x . Consider
that we want p∗e = 0.4 in locations within a radius of r∗ = 200m.
In this case, the obfuscated location would be on average r = 1km
away from the real location, and 5% of the time it would be further
than 2.3km away (yellow line in Fig. 1). In applications that are
not sensitive to large amounts of noise (e.g., weather forecast) this
might be reasonable. However, in other applications where one
would require a utility in the same order of magnitude as the pri-
vacy protection (e.g., finding nearby points of interest), the Laplace
mechanism and, up to some extent, GeoInd, are not desirable.
Planar Laplace with Optimal Remapping. Since this mecha-
nism cannot be evaluated analytically, we follow the empirical
approach in [4]: we use 80% of the users from Gowalla dataset1
to design the remapping function, and use the remaining 12 112
users as a testing set to evaluate the utility of the mechanism after
remapping. We generate an output z for 20 000 random checkins
from testing set users, for values of ϵ from the previous experiment
(ϵ = {6.67, 4, 2, 1}, in km−1), and use them to compute r and r95.
1https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html
The results in terms of p∗e and ϵ∗ vs. d(x ,x ′) coincide with the ones
in Fig. 1, but we obtain much better quality: r = 159, 266, 578 and
1271 meters, i.e., 37 − 47% smaller than plain Laplace. The 95% loss
percentile in each case is r95 = 565, 999, 2146, and 4162 meters,
which is only a 10− 21% reduction from the planar Laplace without
remapping. To obtain a protection of p∗e = 0.4 in a radius of r∗
around the real location, in this scenario one needs to add noise
with a loss of roughly r ≈ 3r∗ and r95 ≈ 10r∗. Although the average
loss reduction is considerable, the utility cost is still large com-
pared to the radius of the privacy region this mechanism ensures.
This highlights the importance of analyzing GeoInd numerically to
understand the actual privacy vs. utility trade-off it provides.
5 OTHER PROPERTIES OF GEOIND
So far we have studied the lower bound (p∗e ) GeoInd mechanisms
provide on the probability of error of the decision adversary (pe ).
We now study other properties of GeoInd mechanisms against this
adversary. For this purpose, we evaluate three mechanisms: the
planar Laplace mechanism, described above, and the Gaussian and
uniform circular mechanisms. The latter mechanisms generate z by
adding to the real location x , respectively, 2-dimensional Gaussian
noise and uniform noise in a circle. We choose not to use remap-
ping, as its improvement would be similar for all mechanisms and
thus does not influence the comparison. For each experiment, we
consider two locations x and x ′ separated a distance d(x ,x ′) and
generate z using the three mechanisms. Then, we measure the prob-
ability of error of the decision adversary pe in that realization, and
repeat this 20 000 times for different values of d(x ,x ′) and r.
The average probability of error of these mechanisms, denoted
by pe and computed by averaging the 20 000 samples of pe , is
shown in Figure 2. Given an average loss r, both Gaussian and
circular mechanisms achieve a larger average error than the Laplace
mechanism, up to a certain distance d(x ,x ′) marked with • in
the figure. We do not show these marks for r = 1000 and r =
2000, but they also lay close to pe = 0.1. At these points, the
Laplace mechanism achieves p∗e ≈ 0.01 and pe ≈ 0.1 for all tested
values of r. The fact that the Laplace mechanism performs better
from • onwards is not significant: in these scenarios, regardless of
the mechanism, the adversary guesses the right location with an
average probability larger than 0.9, i.e., no mechanism provides
privacy. We conclude that, in all relevant scenarios (i.e., reasonable
privacy levels), the Gaussian and circular mechanisms achieve a
larger average error than the Laplace mechanism. This means that
using GeoInd as a way of providing an average protection level
against an adversary with unknown side-information [9, 11] is not
recommended, as it is not the guarantee that this notion provides.
Figure 3 shows the percentage out of the 20 000 realizations
where the Gaussian and circular mechanisms achieve a larger pe
than the Laplace mechanism.We see that these mechanisms achieve
a larger probability of error more often than the Laplace mechanism
when x and x ′ are separated up to a distance d(x ,x ′) corresponding
to the points marked with ■ (Gaussian) and ▲ (circular). The figure
also shows the performance of the Laplace mechanism in terms of
p∗e andpe at these points (these values remain almost constant when
changing r). Similarly to the previous case, these values represent
a very low privacy regime, i.e., for all reasonable privacy levels,
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the Gaussian and circular mechanisms are more likely to achieve a
larger pe than the Laplace mechanism. This is better illustrated in
Figure 4, which shows the normalized histogram of the probability
of error pe provided by the Gaussian and Laplace mechanisms for
d(x ,x ′) = 100m and r = 500m. As expected, the Laplace mechanism
ensures a minimum probability of error (p∗e = 0.4), but is not able
to achieve large probabilities of error as often as the Gaussian
mechanism. These experiments reinforce the idea thatGeoInd is not
a “cure-all” privacy guarantee against a prior-agnostic adversary.
All the above experiments compare mechanisms offering the
same average loss r. In terms of r95, the Laplace mechanism (r95 ≈
2.37r) performs worse than the circular (r95 ≈ 1.46r) and the Gauss-
ian (r95 ≈ 1.95r) alternatives. Thus, compared with a fixed r95, the
Laplace mechanism would perform even worse than the others.
6 WHERE TO GO NOW
Geo-indistinguishability, which provides differential privacy-like
guarantees in the location privacy scenario, has drawn a lot of
attention from the community. However, our quantitative evalu-
ation shows that the (worst-case or average) privacy guarantees
it provides are unsatisfying unless utility is sacrificed. The main
reason for this poor performance is that, in the counting queries
on a database scenario where differential privacy was initially pro-
posed [7], queries have low sensitivity, i.e., the contribution of a
single user does not significantly affect the outcome. This enables
the achievement of a high privacy level (e.g., ϵ∗ = 0.01) without
introducing much noise, thus preserving utility. In the location sce-
nario where Geo-indistinguishability operates, each query has high
sensitivity and therefore requires large noise to provide protection.
For instance, to achieve GeoInd with ϵ∗ = 0.01 between locations
in an area of 100m, the average loss is 20km. Moreover, GeoInd can
only be achieved at the expense of having an unbounded maximum
quality loss since the guarantee (1) no longer holds if the mechanism
is truncated to ensure a minimum utility for the users.
This does not mean that GeoInd should be abandoned, but we
argue that it should be carefully configured, understanding the type
and amount of protection it provides. Our GeoInd characteriza-
tion as an adversary error should assist in this task, as it helps to
quantitatively interpret the degree of protection provided. We have
also shown that in some scenarios there are levels of protection
that are not achievable without unreasonable utility loss. Potential
solutions could be to use bandwidth as a resource to improve util-
ity [2], or re-design location queries to have lower sensitivity (e.g.,
aggregating queries [7] locally, at the user level).
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